Hamas vs Fatah

Jerusalem Viewpoints

No. 506 7 Heshvan 5764 / 2 November 2003


THE MAHATHIR AFFAIR: A CASE STUDY
IN MAINSTREAM ISLAMIC ANTI-SEMITISM
Manfred Gerstenfeld

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At the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir, the conference host, represented relations between Muslims and Jews as a worldwide frontal confrontation, offering some new examples of a "Jewish conspiracy." His words were broadly applauded.
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Since an EU summit was being held at the same time, it was proposed to include a condemnation of Mahathir's remarks in the summit's final statement. However, this was blocked by French President Jacques Chirac and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis. Instead, the condemnation was delegated to the Italian EU presidency.
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A New York Times editorial said the EU's refusal to condemn Mahathir's speech at its own summit adds "a concern that displays of anti-Semitism are being met with inexcusable nonchalance," while a Le Monde editorial noted that "such words are common currency in the Arab Islamic world where they pass for evident truth...and this direct form of racism, purely and simply is practiced as a normal category of the 'political debate.'"
*

The importance of the Mahathir affair is that it has exposed in a short time and in a concentrated way the profound anti-Semitic thought present among major layers of both mainstream Muslim elites and society.
*

The Mahathir affair is also an important case study for the analysis of Western reactions to Islamic anti-Semitism.


Finding Scapegoats for Islamic Weakness

The tenth summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (IOC) - attended by leaders of 57 countries - opened on October 16, 2003, in Putrajaya, Malaysia. In his welcoming speech, the conference host, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohmad Mahathir, attacked the Jews and the West. His main theme was to lament Islam's weakness and to discuss how this could be remedied. His words were broadly applauded. With his remarks about the Jews, Mahathir started a chain reaction that was to provide wide-ranging proof of the character and dynamics of mainstream Islamic anti-Semitism.

While much attention was given to Mahathir's speech, what happened subsequently is even more important. The questions to be addressed are: Who condemned Mahathir and how? Who supported him and in what way? And who remained silent?

Muslims and Jews: A Worldwide Confrontation?

In his speech, Mahathir represented relations between Muslims and Jews as a worldwide frontal confrontation. Though he only devoted a few sentences to Jews, he presented some new examples of what anti-Semitism studies call "the theory of Jewish conspiracy." Mahathir said:

1.3 billion Muslims cannot be defeated by a few million Jews. There must be a way. And we can only find a way if we stop to think, to assess our weaknesses and our strength, to plan, to strategize and then to counter-attack.

We are actually very strong. 1.3 billion people cannot be simply wiped out. The Europeans killed six million Jews out of 12 million. But today the Jews rule this world by proxy. They get others to fight and die for them.

We are up against a people who think. They survived 2000 years of pogroms not by hitting back, but by thinking. They invented and successfully promoted Socialism, Communism, human rights and democracy so that persecuting them would appear to be wrong, so they may enjoy equal rights with others. With these they have now gained control of the most powerful countries and they, this tiny community, have become a world power. We cannot fight them through brawn alone. We must use our brains also.1


Creating Myths

The worldwide attention given to Mahathir's anti-Semitic remarks overshadowed the rest of his speech which contained a number of observations that are typical of much of contemporary discourse by Islamic leaders. Mahathir said: "We are all Muslims. We are all oppressed. We are all being humiliated."

He added: "We are now 1.3 billion strong. We have the biggest oil reserve in the world. We have great wealth. We are not as ignorant as the Jahilliah [the ignorant of the pre-Islamic period] who embraced Islam. We are familiar with the workings of the world's economy and finances. We control 50 out of the 180 countries in the world." He concluded that because Islamic countries do not unite against the outside world, they are not using their power efficiently.

Many of the "facts" Mahathir expressed concerning Muslims were misrepresentations. It is difficult to claim that all Muslims are being humiliated. Many inhabitants of oil-rich countries are quite well-off, where it is Muslims who humiliate other Muslims, sometimes almost treating them like slaves. Mahathir avoided mentioning the near absence of democracy and the presence of major corruption in the Islamic world, responsible for much of its problems. Mahathir replaced these facts with myths.

International Reactions

Mahathir's anti-Semitic attacks led to many reactions from the Western world. U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli said: "We view them with the contempt and derision they deserve."2 A few days later at the Asia-Pacific Summit in Bangkok, President Bush told Mahathir - according to White House spokesman Scott McClellan - that his words about the Jews controlling the West by proxy "were wrong and divisive....It stands squarely against what I believe."3 Mahathir, however, denied that Bush had rebuked him.4

Australian Prime Minister John Howard commented on Mahathir's OIC speech: "Any suggestion from anybody anywhere in the world of dividing the world into Jewish and non-Jewish groupings is historically indefensible and wrong and something that most Australians would regard as quite repugnant."5

Later, at the Asia-Pacific Summit, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer declared: "We regard anti-Semitism as unacceptable and the Australian government hopes that there won't be further comments of this kind."6

The Foreign Minister of New Zealand, Phil Goff, said: "We're concerned about language that brings back memories of so-called Jewish conspiracies."7

Outgoing Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, who also attended the Asia-Pacific Summit, refused to condemn Mahathir personally when asked to do so at a press conference in Bangkok, and referred to an earlier statement by his foreign ministry. The Toronto Star wrote, "Jean Chrétien suffered an unexpected casualty yesterday. He lost his tongue....Chrétien greeted Mahathir with a warm handshake, as many leaders did. But he kept his mouth shut on the subject of anti-Semitism."8

European Union Divisiveness

British Foreign Minister Jack Straw summoned the Malaysian high commissioner to complain about Mahathir's remarks. The Foreign Office stated: "It is particularly regrettable that some positive and welcome messages in Mahathir's speech, such as the emphasis on negotiation being the path to peace, were obscured and overshadowed by racist remarks."9 Also, the German Foreign Office summoned Malaysian diplomats in order to complain.10

Italy currently holds the presidency of the European Union. Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini told reporters: "The [Malaysian] prime minister used expressions that were gravely offensive, very strongly anti-Semitic and...strongly counter to principles of tolerance, dialogue, and understanding between the Western world and the Islamic world."11

Since an EU summit was being held at the same time, it was proposed to include a condemnation of Mahathir's remarks in the summit's 19-page final statement. According to Ha'aretz, the draft stated: "his unacceptable comments hinder all our efforts to further inter-ethnic and religious harmony, and have no place in a decent world. Such false and anti-Semitic remarks are as offensive to Muslims as they are to others."12

However, French President Jacques Chirac opposed the inclusion of these lines in the summit statement, and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis supported Chirac, Ha'aretz reported. According to a statement issued by the French Embassy in Israel, Chirac condemned Mahathir's remarks but considered the EU summit an inappropriate place to state this. French Embassy spokesman Pierre Filatoff told Agence France-Presse that "the EU rules did not allow such declarations (condemning anti-Semitism) to be integrated in such documents."13 Apparently, the leaders of most EU countries thought differently.

Thus, it was decided that the Italian presidency of the Council of the European Union would post a statement on its website, saying: "The EU deeply deplores the comments made earlier today by Dr. Mahathir in his speech at the opening of the 10th session of the Islamic Summit conference in Putrajaya, Malaysia....Such words hinder all our efforts to further inter-ethnic and religious harmony, and have absolutely no place in a tolerant world."14

Chirac's Ambiguity Toward Jews Exposed

By now President Chirac had much reason to be satisfied. He had once again proven his friendship for the Islamic world. He vetoed the condemnation of one of their leaders in a major European Union meeting, and substituted instead an Italian statement on an EU website, as well as a statement by the French Embassy in Israel.

It was Mahathir's reaction, however, which exposed Chirac. The Malaysian prime minister thanked Chirac for blocking the EU summit declaration which intended to deplore his speech. The Malaysian daily The Star quoted Mahathir on Chirac: "I think he understands better. Anybody who reads the whole speech through will understand what I said. In fact, I was worried that the Muslims would be against me, but it was the Europeans who were against me. I can't understand them."15

 

Chirac was now caught in a situation where he had to minimize the damage. Had he not reacted, this would have exposed him as condoning anti-Semitism and would have shown the statement of the French Embassy in Israel to be a minor, meaningless gesture toward the Jews.

Thus, Chirac replied to Mahathir on October 19, saying, "your remarks on the role of Jews provoked strong disapproval in France and around the world."16 Chirac also expressed his approval of Mahathir's calling for an end to Palestinian suicide attacks on Israelis. Yet the French were three days late in making a specific statement from Paris, thus further exposing Chirac's ambivalence toward the Jews. Chirac is facing increasing difficulty in maintaining the facade that he is critical toward Israel but friendly toward the Jews.

In a recent interview, Israel Singer, Chairman of the World Jewish Congress Executive, noted that during the restitution negotiations of the 1990s, Chirac's behavior followed a classic pattern of being anti-Israel and then trying to compensate by being supportive of diaspora Jewry. On a later occasion, however, Chirac told Singer that Jews are the cause of anti-Semitism in France and everywhere else.17

In May 2003, at a meeting in Paris with leaders of the Simon Wiesenthal Center (SWC), Chirac denied the existence of anti-Semitism in France. He claimed that attacks on Jews were only suburban hooliganism. Chirac also mentioned that a year earlier he had invited a Palestinian student in France to lunch at the Elysee Palace after the student had told him he wanted to return to Palestine to kill Jews. When the SWC leaders went to their next meeting not far from Chirac's residence, some of them who wear yarmulkes were insulted by bystanders' anti-Semitic remarks, such as: "Jews get out of France."

The Greek Role

France's allies in the Mahathir affair - the Greek Socialists - have a long history of anti-Jewish racism. Already in 1982, Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou - father of the present Foreign Minister George Papandreou - publicly compared the Israelis to the Nazis.18

Widespread anti-Semitism among Greek politicians, the press, and throughout society is being increasingly exposed by the Simon Wiesenthal Center. At the OSCE/ODHIR Human Dimension Meeting in Warsaw on October 14, 2003, Dr. Shimon Samuels of the SWC presented a lengthy report entitled, "Twenty Months of Anti-Semitic Invective in Greece, March 2002-October 2003." He called for the Greek government to take appropriate measures against the anti-Semitic offensive in its country, which violates the European Union's provisions and international conventions.19

Press Reactions

The Western press reported extensively on the Mahathir affair. The New York Times wrote in an editorial: "Sympathy for the Muslims' plight must not be confused with the acceptance of racism. Most Muslims have indeed been shoddily treated - by their own leaders, who gather at feckless summit meetings instead of offering their people what they most need: human rights, education, and democracy. The European Union was asked to condemn Mr. Mahathir's speech in its statement yesterday ending its own summit. It chose not to, adding a concern that displays of anti-Semitism are being met with inexcusable nonchalance."20

A few days later, the paper balanced these views with a column by Paul Krugman largely blaming the United States for the anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. Krugman called Mahathir's remarks "inexcusable," yet tried to explain them.21 Krugman was smarter than Mahathir. When he stated that Bush backs Sharon unconditionally, this is a much more elegant way of stating the fallacy that the Jews run the world by proxy.

Columnist Richard Cohen in the Washington Post referred to the standing ovation the summit's audience gave Mahathir for his speech: "Mahathir's claque included Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, our guy in Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, and even Russia's Vladimir Putin, representing his country's large Muslim minority....But what corrupts and enfeebles large parts of the Islamic world is not Jews in either New York or Tel Aviv but its own self-serving and inept leadership - in other words, some of the very people who stood and cheered the speech."22

Singapore's Straits Times political editor Zuraidah Ibrahim commented on the speech: "To give it the kindest spin possible, one could say that he was only trying to rally Muslims to learn from the Jews as they seek to slough off the humiliation and oppression of centuries. That he was lauding the Jews for setting a positive example: they responded to persecution by using their brains, not just their brawn. But to leave it at that would be to gloss over his dangerous and irresponsible portrayal of Muslims as being in an epic confrontation against the Jews. The sad truth, however, is that it is a line one has heard said among Muslims. Must it be that way? Must Muslims view the world in such foreboding terms, of them versus us?...It is easy to reduce all of the world's problems to either Islamic terrorism or a Jewish conspiracy. But that doesn't mean it is right."23

The French daily Le Monde wrote in an editorial that nobody had left the hall when Mahathir voiced his anti-Semitic comments. The author wondered why nobody had left and suggested: "Not out of courtesy for the host of this tenth summit. Not out of apathy. For a much more severe reason. Because the audience approved. Because such words are common currency in the Arab Islamic world where they pass for evident truth and are regularly uttered by government, the press - which is most often controlled - and teachers...and this direct form of racism, purely and simply is practiced as a normal category of the 'political debate' - which alas has penetrated some of our [French] suburbs." The paper concluded that Mahathir has allowed himself to announce peaceful means to fight against the "Jews." He should know that his speech nourishes terrorism.24

Jewish Reactions

The Israeli Foreign Ministry condemned Mahathir's speech. So did Minister Natan Sharansky, saying: "This is the first time since World War II that anti-Semitism in its most primitive and vulgar form constitutes the official agenda of a respected international political forum which, in this instance, is composed of nearly one-third of the world. This occurrence is made possible only because of the indifference and lack of concern demonstrated by the Western world when confronted by blatant anti-Semitism. We all know how these things begin - always with Jews - but history has taught us again and again that it never ends with the Jews."25

David Harris, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, said: "This kind of language, which attributes to Jews a variety of demonic powers, is reminiscent of the crudest and most vile anti-Semitism in history."26 Later he said: "This is a good test in terms of international reaction to bigotry. Is it condemnation followed by business as usual, or are there teeth to the denunciation?"27

The Simon Wiesenthal Center condemned Mahathir's speech as: "A diatribe that would have made Hitler and Goebbels proud....Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean of the SWC, blasted Mahathir as a 'dangerous racist whose hateful rhetoric is a virtual invitation for further anti-Semitic attacks.'"28

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in a press release "expressed appreciation to those countries and leaders who strongly condemned the vehemently anti-Semitic speech by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad before the summit of the Organization of Islamic Countries, but called those who acquiesced or were silent in their reaction to the speech, 'willingly complicit in spreading Mahathir's hate.'"29

ADL national director Abraham Foxman expressed specific appreciation to the European Union, Italy, Spain, and Germany, and added, "We are especially outraged by the actions of French President Jacques Chirac and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis to block the inclusion of a condemnation of Mahathir's anti-Semitic speech in the official statement of an EU summit. By their disgraceful behavior, these countries are willingly complicit in spreading these words of hate."30

Colin Rubenstein, executive director of the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), said that Mahathir's "vile assertions were probably the most blatant and viciously anti-Semitic remarks made publicly by any major world figure in decades."31

Amnon Dankner, editor of the Israeli daily Maariv, published a harsh criticism of Chirac's behavior. In a more moderate yet still critical way, the French-Jewish umbrella organization CRIF came out against the European Union and French government's attitude, saying: "It seems to us that the protest of the European Union is insufficient and purely formal. Beyond a formal letter to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, we expect from France a strong, solemn statement of global impact against barbarous utterances."32 Some French-Israeli tensions were a further fall-out of the Mahathir affair.

Mahathir's Anti-Semitic Past

Mahathir has a long history of making anti-Semitic remarks. According to the BBC News website, already in 1970 - long before he became prime minister - Mahathir said, "The Jews, for example, are not merely hook-nosed, but understand money instinctively."33

In December 1997, the World Jewish Congress (WJC) published a policy dispatch devoted to Malaysian anti-Semitism under Mahathir. It said, inter alia, "in 1983, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion was printed in Malaysia....In a 1986 speech at a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, Mahathir stated that 'the expulsion of Jews from the Holy Land 2,000 years ago and the Nazi oppression of Jews have taught them nothing. If anything at all, it has transformed the Jews into the very monsters that they condemn so roundly in their propaganda material. They have been pupils of the late Dr. Goebbels.'"34

In May 1998, Business Week published a letter from ADL national director Abraham Foxman entitled, "Mahathir's Anti-Semitism is an Old Story," in which he wrote: "Although Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad attempts to justify anti-Jewish remarks he made earlier this year, we must remember that those distasteful comments are consistent with his long history of anti-Semitism and belief in a Jewish conspiracy to bring about the downfall of Malaysia. So his recent comments blaming a Jewish conspiracy for Malaysia's economic fall came as no surprise."35

At the 1999 Davos economic conference, Mahathir criticized the Jews using arguments reminiscent of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. He blamed the Jewish connection for Asia's economic problems.36

Retired Israeli ambassador Moshe Yegar, who in the 1960s lived in Malaysia for more than a year, published an essay in summer 2003 entitled: "Malaysia - Anti-Semitic Policy Without Jews." In it he mentioned how in June 1983 the country's prime minister condemned Israel for the campaign in Lebanon, calling it "the most immoral government in the world."37 In 1997, Mahathir claimed his government was afraid the Jews were planning to destroy Malaysia's economy and that of other Muslim countries.38

Malaysia's Three-Fold Strategy of Reaction

In view of the unexpected major criticism, Malaysia developed a three-fold strategy of reaction. The first element was to try to create a smokescreen through contradictory declarations of senior politicians. In an interview with Australian television's Nine Network, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar said that Mahathir had been misunderstood. He added: "I am confident he has no anti-Jewish feeling."39 Yet the next day, Mahathir said: "I have been accused of being anti-Semitic when what I said was only based on facts. That is my perception of things." He added: "These are facts of history and to tell me that I cannot mention facts of history is to deny me my right to free speech."40 He also continued to fan the anti-Semitic flames on the following days.

A second element in the Malaysian strategy of reaction was to mobilize other Islamic leaders to support Mahathir or explain that he was misinterpreted. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami claimed that accusing Mahathir of being anti-Semitic was "Western propaganda....No Muslim is anti-Semitic."41

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said at a press conference, "I don't think he called for war against the Jews or anything like that, he expressed his own thoughts…but I'm very sure he did not ask Muslims to go to war with anyone."42 The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, said: "Dr. Mahathir was just talking about issues confronting the Muslim world and what Muslims should do."43

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Maher argued that Mahathir's remarks had been taken out of context. If one read the entire speech, it would show that he "had in fact made a shrewd and deep assessment of the problems facing the Muslims."44 Farouk Kaddoumi of the PLO observed that Mahathir spoke the truth, "but Israel and their sympathizers tend to regard any statement against them as anti-Semitic. They accuse us while they occupy our country, kill our people, and claim that we are terrorists."45

Abdikassim Salad Hassan, President of Somalia, stated: "My entourage and I found Dr. Mahathir's speech very straightforward and in-depth. He was not trying to incite hatred or incite the Muslims to go to war against the Jews, but in fact his speech was about unity to face the threats from the Jews."46

Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Indonesian president, took a similar line. She claimed the foreign media had misinterpreted Mahathir's speech, which was indicative of the information gap between Muslim and non-Muslim countries: "That is why there should be more communication between these two sides, to put through the real message of Islam, which is essentially one of tolerance and moderation. We have to put across our own values."47

The third element in the Malaysian government's strategy, the Malaysian media, pointed out that Mahathir had been misinterpreted,48 while criticizing the reactions of Western leaders. Ahmad A. Talib wrote in the New Straits Times: "Imagine. These are reactions from so-called world leaders who have often declared that they are promoters of freedom of speech and a democratic way of life....Some of us flipped when we read the news item datelined London: 'UK summons Malaysian diplomat over comments on Jews.' Someone in Kuala Lumpur makes a comment on Jews and a representative of the government is hauled up by a foreign government."49

Another of the paper's columnists, Shamsul Akmar, wrote that the question remained whether the Jews controlled the world. He added: "Should the rest of the world also ignore the genocide waged by Israelis against Palestinians just because Washington is silent about it?"50

Very few voices in the Islamic media condemned Mahathir's statements, further proving how deep-seated anti-Semitism is in what is called the "moderate" Islamic world.

Conclusion

The smokescreen the Malaysians tried to create around their prime minister's words didn't last very long. On October 21, Mahathir told the Bangkok Post: "Just recently in Japan, the Japanese newspapers put down my talk to me being anti-Semitic...they pick up one sentence in which I said the Jews control the world. Well, the reaction of the world shows that they control the world. The Europeans and the Americans and others want to condemn me when, in fact, one chap said all Muslims are terrorists. Did the European Union pass a resolution to say that this is against Muslims?"51 He added that he has Jews among his friends, thus using a classic line of those who have to explain away their anti-Semitism. Mahathir has also frequently attacked the United States, Australia, the Europeans, homosexuals, and many others.52

The importance of the Mahathir affair is that it has exposed in a short time and in a concentrated way the profound anti-Semitic thought present among major layers of both Muslim elites and society. There is no shame in publicly using the most vile anti-Semitic expressions including those from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. This work of falsification is regularly republished throughout the Islamic world.

Mahathir has thus generated a wide-ranging demonstration of mainstream Islamic anti-Semitism. The Mahathir affair now serves as the core proof of this anti-Semitism, while the remainder of the abundant anti-Jewish material from the Islamic world serves as supporting evidence for this mainstream racism.

Finally, Mahathir's words at the Islamic summit were applauded and later backed by many others. These reactions show that the Islamic world - in which hardly anybody is democratically elected - is dangerous not only for the Jews but for the rest of humanity as well. Beyond those extremist Muslims who preach genocide using the Arab expression jihad, the Mahathir affair has demonstrated how problematic the world of ideas of mainstream Islamic society is for the West. It is also an important case study for the analysis of Western reactions to Islamic anti-Semitism.

* * *

Notes

1. News Desk, "Dr. Mahathir Opens 10th OIC Summit," The Star, October 16, 2003. (This article contains the full text of the speech.)
2. "What They Say about Mahathir's Remarks on Jews," Straits Times, October 19, 2003.
3. Darren Schuettler, "Bush Tells Mahathir His Jew Remarks are 'Wrong,'" Reuters, October 20, 2003.
4. Nirmal Ghosh, "Mahathir Downplays Bush Criticism," Straits Times, October 23, 2003.
5. Ibid.
6. "Anti-Jewish Remarks May Mar Mahathir's Political Swan Song," Sydney Morning Herald, October 20, 2003.
7. Ibid.
8. Martin Regg Cohn, "Chretien Has No Comment on Mahathir," Toronto Star, October 21, 2003.
9. John Aglionby, "West Accuses Malaysian PM of Racism," Guardian, October 18, 2003.
10. Ibid.
11. Straits Times, October 19, 2003.
12. Sharon Sadeh, Yoav Stern, and Amiram Barkat, "EU Condemns Malaysian PM's Remarks on Jews, But No Apology is Forthcoming," Ha'aretz, October 19, 2003.
13. "Chirac Backed EU Condemnation of Malaysian PM: Spokeswoman," EU Business, October 19, 2003.
14. Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union [website], October 16, 2003.
15. Devid Rajah and Clarence Chua, "Mahathir Thanks Chirac for Support," The Star, October 19, 2003.
16. "France Condemns Mahathir Speech on Jews," Reuters, October 19, 2003.
17. Manfred Gerstenfeld interview with Israel Singer, "Restitution: The Second Round," Post-Holocaust and Anti-Semitism, November 2, 2003.
18. Daniel Perdurant, "Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Greek Society," Analysis of Current Trends in Anti-Semitism, no. 7 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1995), p. 10.
19. Simon Wiesenthal Center, "Twenty Months of Anti-Semitic Invective in Greece, March 2002-October 2003," October 14, 2003.
20. Editorial, "Islamic Anti-Semitism," New York Times, October 18, 2003.
21. Paul Krugman, "Listening to Mahathir," New York Times, October 21, 2003.
22. Richard Cohen, "Return to Wannsee," Washington Post, October 21, 2003.
23. Zuraidah Ibrahim, "Insight: Drop that Jews vs Muslims Worldview," Sunday Times, October 18, 2003.
24. "L'editorial du Monde, Antisemitisme," Le Monde, October 19, 2003 [French].
25. As communicated by Minister Sharansky's office.
26. American Jewish Committee Press Release, "AJC Condemns Anti-Semitic Remarks by Malaysian Prime Minister," October 16, 2003.
27. Ron Kampeas, "After Mahathir's Anti-Semitic Remarks, Jews Wonder If Outrage Will Yield Change," JTA, October 21, 2003.
28. Simon Wiesenthal Center Press Information, "Mahathir's OIC Diatribe Would Make Hitler and Goebbels Proud and is a Warrant for Anti-Semitic Terrorism," October 16, 2003.
29. "ADL Statement on World Reaction to Mahathir's Speech," Press Release, October 17, 2003.
30. Ibid.
31. News.com.au, "Jews Condemn Mahathir," October 17, 2003.
32. CRIF, "Chirac Explains He Condemned Malaysia's PM, Denies He Blocked EU Move. Jewish Leaders Not Convinced," October 22, 2003.
33. BBC News, August 10, 2003.
34. "'The Protocols' Malaysian Style: The Case of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad," World Jewish Congress Policy Dispatch, no. 24, December 1987.
35. Abraham Foxman, "Mahathir's Anti-Semitism is an Old Story," Business Week, May 14, 2003.
36. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Anti-Semitism Monitoring Forum, Government Secretariat: Report of Anti-Semitic Incidents - February 1999."
37. Moshe Yegar, "Malaysia - Anti-Semitic Policy Without Jews," Gesher, Summer 2003, p. 81 [Hebrew].
38. Ibid., p. 87.
39. "Malaysian Defends PM's Statement on Jews," AP/New York Times, October 19, 2003.
40. "Dr. M Hits Out at the West for Distorting His Speech," The Star, October 18, 2003.
41. "Leaders Rally to Defend Dr. Mahathir," New Straits Times, October 17, 2003.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. "To the Defense of Dr. Mahathir," The Star, October 18, 2003.
47. Ibid.
48. Ashraf Abdullah, "International Media Twisting Dr. M's Words," New Straits Times, October 18, 2003.
49. Ahmad A. Talib, "Outcry Over Dr. Mahathir's Remarks Makes No Sense," New Straits Times, October 19, 2003.
50. Shamsul Akmar, "The Question Still Is: Do Jews Control the World?" New Straits Times, October 18, 2003.
51. Pichai Chuensuksawadi, "Exclusive Interview/Mahathir Mohamad," Bangkok Post, October 21, 2003.
52. BBC News, August 10, 2003.
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Manfred Gerstenfeld, Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is an international consultant specializing in business and environmental strategy to the senior ranks of multi-national corporations, and an associate editor of the Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, for which he co-chairs the Judaism Task Force. His books include Israel's New Future: Interviews (JCPA and Rubin Mass, 1994); Environment and Confusion: Searching for a Balanced View (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies/Rubin Mass, 2nd English ed., 2002); Judaism, Environmentalism and the Environment (Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies/Rubin Mass, 1998). His book Europe's Crumbling Myths: Today's Anti-Semitism's Post-Holocaust Origins will be published in the coming month. For more essays by the author, see www.manfred-gerstenfeld.net.

The Jerusalem Letter and Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints are published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112, Internet: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies, Baltimore Hebrew University, 5800 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21215 USA, Tel. (410) 664-5222; Fax. (410) 664-1228. © Copyright. All rights reserved. ISSN: 0792-7304.

The opinions expressed by the authors of Viewpoints do not necessarily reflect those of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

 

Indonesia has no formal relations with Israel and is part of the World wide Muslim Boycott of the Jewish state. And the same is true with Moroco. Just I don't see how anyone can has off these silly side show actions, and then consider either of them "moderate". What are they moderate to? Hitler?

Ruben

 

green is Free

Freedom House map of world freedom, 2005.
Countries in Red are ranked "Not Free".
Green is "Free". Beige is "Partly Free".

 

where Purple is "Not Free". Green is "Free". Yellow is "Partly Free".

 

Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics
Support for Terror Wanes Among Muslim Publics

Released: 07.14.05

Navigate this report
Summary of Findings
About the Pew Global Attitudes Project
I. How Muslims and Westerners See Each Other
II. How Non-Muslim Publics View Muslims
III. How Muslims See Themselves and Islam's Role
IV. How Muslims View Relations with the World
Methodological Appendix
Questionnaire

Summary of Findings

Concerns over Islamic extremism, extensive in the West even before this month's terrorist attacks in London, are shared to a considerable degree by the publics in several predominantly Muslim nations surveyed. Nearly three-quarters of Moroccans and roughly half of those in Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia see Islamic extremism as a threat to their countries. At the same time, most Muslim publics are expressing less support for terrorism than in the past. Confidence in Osama bin Laden has declined markedly in some countries and fewer believe suicide bombings that target civilians are justified in the defense of Islam.

Nonetheless, the polling also finds that while Muslim and non-Muslim publics share some common concerns, they have very different attitudes regarding the impact of Islam on their countries. Muslim publics worry about Islamic extremism, but the balance of opinion in predominantly Muslim countries is that Islam is playing a greater role in politics – and most welcome that development. Turkey is a clear exception; the public there is divided about whether a greater role for Islam in the political life of that country is desirable.

In non-Muslim countries, fears of Islamic extremism are closely associated with worries about Muslim minorities. Western publics believe that Muslims in their countries want to remain distinct from society, rather than adopt their nation's customs and way of life. Moreover, there is a widespread perception in countries with significant Muslim minorities, including the U.S., that resident Muslims have a strong and growing sense of Islamic identity. For the most part, this development is viewed negatively, particularly in Western Europe. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, those who see a growing sense of Islamic identity among resident Muslims overwhelmingly say this is a bad thing.

The latest survey by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted among more than 17,000 people in 17 countries this spring, finds that while many Muslims believe that radical Islam poses a threat, there are differing opinions as to its causes. Sizable minorities in most predominantly Muslim countries point to poverty, joblessness and a lack of education, but pluralities in Jordan and Lebanon cite U.S. policies as the most important cause of Islamic extremism.

The polling also finds that in most majority-Muslim countries surveyed, support for suicide bombings and other acts of violence in defense of Islam has declined significantly. In Turkey, Morocco and Indonesia, 15% or fewer now say such actions are justifiable. In Pakistan, only one-in-four now take that view (25%), a sharp drop from 41% in March 2004. In Lebanon, 39% now regard acts of terrorism as often or sometimes justified, again a sharp drop from the 73% who shared that view in 2002. A notable exception to this trend is Jordan, where a majority (57%) now says suicide bombings and other violent actions are justifiable in defense of Islam.

When it comes to suicide bombings in Iraq, however, Muslims in the surveyed countries are divided. Nearly half of Muslims in Lebanon and Jordan, and 56% in Morocco, say suicide bombings against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable. However, substantial majorities in Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia take the opposite view.

As in past Global Attitudes surveys, publics in predominantly Muslim countries believe that democracy can work in their countries. Large and growing majorities in Morocco (83%), Lebanon (83%), Jordan (80%) and Indonesia (77%) – as well as pluralities in Turkey (48%) and Pakistan (43%) – say democracy can work well and is not just for the West.

Yet there is some ambivalence about the role of Islam in government. Majorities or pluralities in each of the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, except for Jordan, say Islam is playing a greater role in politics than a few years ago. But those who see Islam playing a large role in political life are also somewhat more likely to say that Islamic extremism poses a threat to their countries.

Overall, the sense that Islamic extremism poses a major national threat is strongest in Morocco, the site of a devastating terrorist attack two years ago, where nearly three-quarters of the public (73%) hold that view. In Pakistan, 52% believe Islamic extremism presents a very or fairly great threat to the country, as do 47% in Turkey. In Lebanon, opinions are divided, with Christians much more likely to see Islamic extremism as a threat than Muslims. And just 10% of Jordanians view Islamic extremism as at least a fairly great threat.

Outside the Muslim world, the Pew survey finds that in countries such as India, Russia, Germany and the Netherlands, concerns about Islamic extremism – both within their own borders and around the world – are running high. Worries over Islamic extremism are nearly as high in France and Spain. Concerns about terrorism at home and around the world run parallel in only three countries, Russia, India and Spain. Before the London terrorist attacks, Americans and Britons expressed more concern about extremism around the world than they did at home.

There also is evidence that these concerns are associated with opposition to Turkey's entry into the European Union. Overall, nearly two-thirds of French (66%) and Germans (65%) oppose Turkey's EU bid, as do a majority of the Dutch (53%). Support for Turkey's admittance to the EU is most extensive in Spain (68%) and Great Britain (57%).

An analysis of the polling finds that opposition to Turkey's admission is also tied to growing concerns about national identity. Negative views about immigration – not only from the Middle East and Africa but from Eastern Europe as well – are even more strongly related to opposition to Turkey's admission to the EU than are concerns over Islamic extremism.

Nonetheless, favorable views of Muslims outpace negative views in most countries of North America and Europe. Hostility toward Muslims is much lower in Great Britain, the United States and Canada than in other Western countries surveyed. And while worries about Islamic extremism are substantial in these three English speaking countries, the survey found somewhat less concern about rising Islamic identity among their resident Muslim populations.

 

Islam in Politics

A complex set of attitudes about the place of Islam in politics emerges from the findings. Most people surveyed in predominantly Muslim countries identify themselves first as Muslims, rather than as citizens of their country. Moreover, except in Jordan, there is considerable acknowledgement that Islam is playing a significant role in the political life of these countries.

Worries about extremism are often greater among those who believe Islam has a significant voice in the political life of their country. This is particularly the case in Turkey and Morocco. The polling finds that those in Turkey who self-identify primarily with their nationality worry more about Islamic extremism than do those who think of themselves first as Muslim.

However, Muslim publics who see Islam's influence in politics increasing say that this trend is good for their country, while those who see Islam's influence slipping overwhelmingly say it is bad. Turkey, whose EU candidacy is weakened by European worries about Islamic extremism, has the least clear cut opinions on this issue. An increasing role for Islam in politics in Turkey, a country that has been officially secular since 1923, is seen as a bad thing. Those in Turkey who see Islam's influence diminishing are divided over whether this is good (44%) or bad (47%).

Views of Religious Groups

Majorities in Great Britain, France, Canada, the U.S. and Russia, as well as pluralities in Spain and Poland, say they have a somewhat or very favorable view of Muslims. In the West, only among the Dutch and Germans does a majority or plurality hold unfavorable views of Muslims (51% and 47%, respectively).

For their part, people in predominantly Muslim countries have mixed views of Christians and strongly negative views of Jews. In Lebanon, which has a large Christian minority, 91% of the public thinks favorably of Christians. Smaller majorities in Jordan and Indonesia also have positive views of Christians. However, in Turkey (63%), Morocco (61%) and Pakistan (58%), solid majorities express negative opinions of Christians.

Anti-Jewish sentiment is endemic in the Muslim world. In Lebanon, all Muslims and 99% of Christians say they have a very unfavorable view of Jews. Similarly, 99% of Jordanians have a very unfavorable view of Jews. Large majorities of Moroccans, Indonesians, Pakistanis and six-in-ten Turks also view Jews unfavorably.

In the Asian countries surveyed, views of religious groups are generally more moderate. India, with its substantial Muslim minority, is closely divided with respect to views about Muslims; 46% hold a favorable view while 43% view them unfavorably. Opinions of Christians are considerably higher: 61% favorable compared with 19% unfavorable. Most Indians (56%) offer no opinion on Jews; those that do split 28% favorable to 17% unfavorable.

In China, half view Muslims unfavorably while only 20% hold a favorable opinion. Views about Christians are scarcely better: 47% unfavorable compared with 26% favorable. Chinese views of Jews are essentially the same as their attitudes toward Christians: 49% negative vs. 28% positive.

In most of Europe as well as North America, majorities or pluralities judge some religions as more prone to violence than others, and those that do mostly have Islam in mind. Similarly, in India, among the 39% who see some religions as more violent than others, nearly three-in-four (73%) point to Islam, while 17% designate Hinduism. In predominantly Muslim countries, many agree that some religions are more prone to violence than others, but those who think this mostly have Judaism in mind. In Turkey, a plurality sees Christianity as the most violent.

Ban Muslim Head Scarves?

On another controversial issue, the prohibition on wearing head scarves by Muslim women in public places including schools, attitudes are uniformly negative in the Muslim world but differ sharply among non-Muslim countries.

Majorities in the U.S., Canada and Great Britain, as well as pluralities in Spain, Russia and Poland, view such prohibitions as a bad idea. However, in France, where a ban on wearing head scarves and other "conspicuous" religious symbols in secular schools went into effect last year, a large majority (78%) favors such prohibitions. They are joined in this view by smaller majorities in Germany (54%), the Netherlands (51%) and by nearly two-thirds of the Indian public (66%).

In Turkey, where a longstanding ban on head scarves in schools and public buildings has come under increasing attack from Muslim activists, 64% of the public calls such a ban a bad idea compared with 29% who view it as a good idea. Lebanon weighs in against head scarf bans by 59% opposed to 29% in favor, while even larger majorities in Jordan (97%), Indonesia (95%), Morocco (90%) and Pakistan (77%) call them a bad idea.

Views of bin Laden

While support for suicide bombings and other terrorist acts has fallen in most Muslim-majority nations surveyed, so too has confidence in Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In Lebanon, just 2% report some or a lot of confidence in bin Laden, and in Turkey only 7% do so.

In Morocco, just 26% of the public now say they have a lot or some confidence in bin Laden, down sharply from 49% in May 2003. In Indonesia, the public is now about evenly split, with 35% saying they place at least some confidence in bin Laden and 37% saying they have little or none; that represents a major shift since 2003, when 58% expressed confidence in bin Laden.

In Pakistan, however, a narrow majority (51%) places some measure of confidence in bin Laden, a slight increase from 45% in 2003. And in Jordan, support for the Al Qaeda leader has risen over the last two years from 55% to a current 60%, including 25% who say they have a lot of confidence in him. Unsurprisingly, support for bin Laden in non-Muslim countries is measured in the small single digits.

Declining support for terror in a number of the Muslim countries surveyed tracks with previously reported dramatic increases in favorable views of the United States in Indonesia and Morocco. Favorable opinions of the U.S. surged most among younger people in Morocco, but were equally evident among both the young and old in Indonesia. The polling also found that in most Muslim countries women were less likely to express an opinion of the U.S. than were men, but when they did, they held a somewhat more positive view.

Roadmap to the Report

The first section of the report analyzes how people in Western countries view people of the Muslim faith and how people in predominantly Muslim countries view people of the Christian and Jewish faiths. It also looks at attitudes toward the banning of Muslim head scarves in some countries and differing views of the U.S. among demographic groups in Muslim countries. Section II focuses on concerns in non-Muslim countries about growing Islamic identity and extremism as well as opinions about Turkey's bid to join the European Union. Section III deals with Muslims' perceptions of themselves and the role of Islam in the political life of their home country, and concerns about Islamic extremism within their own borders. A final section explores views in predominantly Muslim countries of Islam's role in the larger world and support for acts of terrorism in support of Islam both generally and specifically against the U.S. and its allies in Iraq. At the end of each section, excerpts from interviews conducted by the International Herald Tribune are included to illustrate some of the themes covered by the survey.

A description of the Pew Global Attitudes Project and a list of the countries surveyed immediately follows. A summary of the methodology can be found at the end of the report, along with complete results for all countries surveyed.

Navigate this report
Summary of Findings
About the Pew Global Attitudes Project
I. How Muslims and Westerners See Each Other
II. How Non-Muslim Publics View Muslims
III. How Muslims See Themselves and Islam's Role
IV. How Muslims View Relations with the World
Methodological Appendix
Questionnaire

 

Where Terrorism Finds Support in the Muslim World
That May Depend on How You Define It - and Who Are the Targets

Pew Global Attitudes Project
May 23, 2006

by Richard Wike, Pew Global Attitudes Project and Nilanthi Samaranayake, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press

What produces terrorists and what conditions allow them to multiply in number and power in the Muslim world? While many studies point to the important role public opinion plays in creating an environment in which terrorist groups can flourish, relatively few works have explored survey data to measure support for terrorism among general publics. Findings from the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes survey on attitudes toward suicide bombing and civilian attacks and other measures of support for terrorism offer some revealing perspectives on this question.i

Most notably, the survey finds that terrorism is not a monolithic concept--support for terrorist activity depends importantly on its type and on the location in which it occurs. For example, Moroccans overwhelmingly disapprove of suicide bombings against civilians, but, among respondents in the six predominantly Muslim countries surveyed, they are the most likely to see it as a justifiable tactic against Americans and other westerners in Iraq. Opinions about the United States, its attitudes in dealing with the larger world and the Iraq war are also powerful factors in shaping support for terrorism, as are perceptions that Islam is under threat. With the exception of gender, demographic differences, including income, explain little if anything about attitudes toward terrorism in the Muslim world, but country-specific differences are significant, suggesting the importance of local social, political and religious conditions.

These findings are generally though not entirely consistent with other studies of the origins and growth of Islamic terrorism. Much of the relevant literature, however, differs in its focus, concentrating instead on the motivations of terrorist organizations and their members. For example, groups may turn to suicide bombing when other strategies fail (Martha Crenshaw, 1998) or when they find themselves in competition for public support with other militant groups (Mia Bloom, 2005). Robert Pape (2003) finds that terrorism can be a "rational" strategy, pursued by groups, including secular groups, seeking territorial concessions from liberal democracies (2003). Several authors examine the link between political authoritarianism and terror. Alberto Abadie (2004) finds countries in transition from authoritarianism to democracy at a heightened risk for terrorist activities, while Gregory Gause (2005) argues that authoritarian regimes may be best equipped to stifle terrorism - he offers China as an example. Still others see support for terrorism driven in part by opposition to U.S. foreign policy. For instance, Scott Atran (2004) finds "no evidence that most people who support suicide actions hate Americans' internal cultural freedoms, but rather every indication that they oppose U.S. foreign policies, particularly regarding the Middle East."

Relatively few studies have addressed the public attitudes that allow terrorism to take root and grow in certain societies; those that have rely on earlier data than is provided by the 2005 Pew study. In their analysis of Lebanese Muslim attitudes, Simon Haddad and Hilal Khashan (2002) find that younger respondents and those who endorse political Islam are more likely than others to approve of the September 11 attacks. However, they find that income and education are unrelated to such opinions. Examining polling data from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova (2002) also conclude that, contrary to much conventional wisdom, poverty and low education are not key drivers of support for terrorism.

Similarly, in a recent study, Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd (2006) analyze 2002 Pew Global Attitudes data and find that women, young people, computer users, those who believe Islam is under threat, and those who want religious leaders to play a larger role in politics are more likely to support suicide bombing and other attacks against civilians. Fair and Shepherd find that financial status is also a significant determinant -- that the very poor are less, not more, likely to support such attacks.

What then do more recent data show?

 

Declining Support for Terrorism

Table 1Overall, the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes survey finds that support for terrorism has generally declined since 2002 in the six predominantly Muslim countries included in the study - Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey - although there are some variations across countries and survey items.

We will focus on results for three terrorism-related measures: attitudes about suicide bombing and other violence against civilians, views on suicide bombing carried out against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq, and opinions about Osama bin Laden. The first two measures were only asked of Muslim respondents. All respondents were asked their opinion of bin Laden; however, we will restrict our analysis to Muslim respondents.

The most basic measure of support for terrorism asked respondents the following question: "Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?"

Table 2As Table 1 illustrates, the share of the public that believes suicide bombing and other violence is justifiable varies considerably across countries, with Jordanian Muslims significantly more likely than others to support terrorist acts. Lebanon and Pakistan form a middle tier on this question, followed by Indonesia, Turkey, and Morocco, where solid majorities say these forms of violence are never justified. In five of the six countries, support for such attacks has dropped since the last time the question was asked, although the decline in Turkey is insignificant. The lone exception is Jordan, where support has actually increased 14 points since 2002.

The most dramatic drop in support for terrorism is seen in Morocco, a country that experienced a devastating terrorist attack in May 2003. Fully 79% of Moroccans surveyed in 2005 said that support for suicide bombing and violence against civilians was never justified--more than double the percentage (38%) who had expressed this view a year earlier.

Table 3A second question asked respondents specifically about suicide bombing in Iraq: "What about suicide bombing carried out against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq? Do you personally believe that this is justifiable or not justifiable?"

Interestingly, despite the overall decline in support for terrorist acts among its citizens, Morocco is the only country in which a majority says attacks on Americans and other westerners in Iraq are justified. Roughly half of Jordanian and Lebanese Muslims support such acts, while fewer than 30% of Muslims in Pakistan, Indonesia and Turkey agree. In all four countries where trends exist, support for suicide attacks in Iraq has declined, including a large, 21-point drop in Jordan.

Finally, respondents were asked how much confidence they have in Osama bin Laden to do the right thing in world affairs. The results show support for bin Laden has declined in four of the six countries. Jordan and Pakistan are the exceptions, with the percentage of Muslims who have a lot or some confidence in bin Laden rising five points among Jordanians and six points among Pakistanis.
Independence of Terrorism Measures

Table 4It is clear that across all three measures, support for terrorism has declined generally. However, it is also clear that levels of support vary across questions, suggesting that each measures a different facet of how people view terrorism.

This can be illustrated by examining the relationship between views about suicide bombing generally and suicide bombing specifically in Iraq. As Table 4 demonstrates, in some predominately Muslim countries a significant number of people who believe that suicide bombing and other attacks against civilians are at least sometimes justifiable still do not support suicide bombing against Westerners in Iraq. For example, in Turkey among respondents who say suicide bombing is rarely, sometimes, or often justified, a 49% plurality says that suicide bombing in Iraq is not justifiable. By contrast, in Morocco 81% and in Jordan 68% of those who say targeting civilians is at least sometimes justified also find it justifiable in Iraq.

Table 5Similarly, those who believe that suicide bombing and other attacks against civilians are at least sometimes justifiable do not necessarily have confidence in Osama bin Laden. Again, results vary significantly by country, with 71% of Jordanian Muslims who believe violence against civilians can be justified also having confidence in bin Laden, compared with only 5% of Turks.

Finally, the relationship between views about suicide bombing in Iraq and views of bin Laden also differ significantly among the six countries. For instance, 82% of Jordanian Muslims who think suicide bombing in Iraq against Westerners is justifiable also have a lot or some confidence in bin Laden. However, only 6% of Lebanese in the same category also have confidence in bin Laden.
Correlates of Support for Terrorism

As noted above, differences in opinions about terrorism have been linked not only to demographic variables, notably age and gender, but also to views about Islam, democracy, and the United States. Four sets of variables are used to explore whether these patterns are significant in the 2005 survey data.

* Demographic variables - these include gender, age, education, and income, as well as whether a respondent has a child under age 18 living in the household and whether the respondent regularly uses a computer. Since measures for education and income differ across countries, for the purposes of analysis respondents are characterized as low or high education, and as low, middle, or high income.
* Views about Islam - Both the academic literature and the popular press have emphasized links between terrorism and an extremist brand of Islam. Responses to three questions are used to explore any potential relationships between opinions on religion and terrorism. The first asks respondents whether their primary identity is as a Muslim or as a citizen of their country (Jordanian, Moroccan, etc.). The second asks how important it is that Islam plays a more influential role in the world than it does now. The third asks whether the respondent thinks there are any serious threats to Islam today.
* Opinions about democracy - Two questions test these attitudes among respondents. The first asks whether democracy is a Western way of doing things that will not work in the respondent's country or if democracy is not just for the West and would work in their country. The second asks respondents if they are more optimistic or more pessimistic these days that the Middle East will become more democratic.
* Attitudes toward the United States - In addition to a straightforward favorability question about the U.S., these measures include questions about: the extent to which the U.S. takes into account the interests of countries such as the respondent's country when making international policy decisions; how worried, if at all, respondents are that the American military will become a threat to their country; whether the war in Iraq has made the world safer or more dangerous; and whether the U.S. government favors or opposes democracy in the respondent's country.ii

Comparison of levels of support for the three measures of terrorism against these four sets of variables reveals a number of associations. As seen in Table 6, across all three measures, men are generally more supportive of terrorism than are women. Meanwhile, individuals with children are less supportive of suicide bombing generally, but more supportive of bin Laden. Support for terrorism is also more common among persons who identify primarily as Muslim, those who believe it is important for Islam to play an influential role on the world stage, and those who believe Islam faces serious threats.

Whether or not an individual thinks democracy is solely a Western way appears to have only modest effects on support for terrorism (it should be noted that relatively few Muslims, ranging from 12% in Morocco to 38% in Turkey, believe democracy is solely a Western form of government). On the other hand, across all three measures, those who are pessimistic about the prospects for Middle East democracy have more favorable attitudes toward terrorism.

 

Views about the U.S. appear strongly associated with attitudes toward terrorism, with support for terrorism higher among people who have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S., those who believe American foreign policy does not consider the interests of countries like theirs, those who are concerned that the U.S. may pose a military threat to their country, and those who believe the U.S. opposes democracy in their country.
Table 6
Multivariate Analysis

Still, the question remains whether many of these variables have independent strength in explaining attitudes toward terrorism or whether they are primarily proxies for other significant variables with which they themselves are correlated. To determine whether these associations remain significant once other factors are controlled for, we conducted two types of regressionsiii including the variables described above as along with dummy variables to assess country specific effects.

As illustrated in Table 7, when other factors are controlled for, most demographic variables no longer show significant effects on opinions regarding suicide bombing and civilian attacks. However, gender remains significant in views about suicide bombing against Westerners in Iraq or confidence in bin Laden, with women less likely than men to support such bombing or the Al Qaeda leader. Income is also a significant determinant of support for bin Laden, with wealthier individuals holding a more negative view of the al Qaeda leader.

Two of the measured attitudes toward Islam also remain significant. The belief that it is important for Islam to play an influential role in the world is positively related to support for suicide bombing in Iraq and confidence in bin Laden. The perception that there are serious threats to Islam is positively associated with support for suicide bombing and other attacks against civilians, as well as suicide bombing against Westerners in Iraq. However, primarily identifying as a Muslim is not significantly related to any of the three dependent variables.

Variables measuring attitudes toward democracy show limited effects. The only instance in which either of the two democracy measures is significant is that people who believe democracy is not just a western way and can work in their country are less likely to support terrorist attacks against civilians.

By contrast, some attitudes toward the U.S. are strongly associated with views on terrorism. Support for terrorism is positively correlated with negative views of the U.S., a perception that the U.S. does not favor democracy in a respondent's country, and a belief that the Iraq war has made the world more dangerous.

Finally, nearly all of the country indicators are significant, indicating that country specific factors have a great deal of influence on attitudes toward terrorism.iV

The results show that the variables for Jordan and Lebanon are positively related to support for attacks against civilians, while the other three countries are negatively related to this measure. In the second model, with support for suicide bombing in Iraq as the dependent variable, variables for three countries -- Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan -- are positively associated with approval of suicide attacks in Iraq. Meanwhile, the Turkey variable is negatively associated with support for suicide terrorism in Iraq. Finally, in the third model Morocco is the excluded category, and Pakistanis, Jordanians, and Indonesians are found to be more supportive of bin Laden, while Lebanese and Turkish Muslims are less likely to have confidence in bin Laden.
Table 7
Conclusions

The findings suggest several general conclusions about public opinion regarding terrorism in these six predominantly Muslim countries. First, the 2005 poll finds support for terrorism on the decline, although there are a few exceptions to this pattern, and support remains rather high in some countries, notably Jordan. Previous research has shown that support tends to decline among publics after they have experienced attacks on their own soil, and future research will determine whether such a drop has occurred in Jordan following the November 2005 bombings in Amman.

Second, terrorism is not a monolithic concept, and different facets of terrorism have different patterns of public support. Many individuals who say suicide bombing in defense of Islam may be justifiable do not support it in Iraq, and vice versa. For example, while Moroccans are the least supportive of suicide bombing when it is described in general terms, they are the most likely to approve of suicide bombing specifically in Iraq.

Third, demographic characteristics appear to have relatively small effects on attitudes towards terrorism, with the exception of gender. Contrary to Fair and Shepherd, we find that women are generally less likely to approve of terrorist acts and are less likely to hold favorable views of Osama bin Laden.

Fourth, views about Islam are linked, to some extent, to views about terrorism. In particular, and consistent with Fair and Shepherd, we find the perception that Islam is under threat is positively correlated with support for terrorism.

Next, we find that opinions of the United States and of American foreign policy are important determinants of attitudes towards terrorism. The perception that the U.S. acts unilaterally in international affairs, concerns about the American military becoming a threat, negative views of the Iraq war, the belief that the U.S. opposes democracy in the region, and a generally unfavorable view of America all drive pro-terrorism sentiments.

Finally, the multivariate analysis finds significant country-specific effects, suggesting that conditions giving rise to terror are greatly influenced by local political, social, and religious factors. Future studies should seek to shed more light on these country specific influences, as well as the factors that shape public opinion on terrorism across nations.

A longer version of the paper was presented at the annual conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Montreal, Canada, May 18-21, 2006

Appendix

Field dates for the survey, as well as the number of Muslims in each country sample are shown below.
Indonesia April 30-May 16, 200 N=970 Muslims
Jordan May 3-24, 2005 N=967 Muslims
Lebanon May 3-24, 2005 N=563 Muslims
Morocco June 6-16, 2005 N=1000 General public (religion not asked)
Pakistan May 2-24, 2005 N=1203 Muslims
Turkey April 27-May 14, 2005 N=965 Muslims

Full wording of questions
Works Cited

Abadie, Alberto. 2004. "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism." Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper Series.

Atran, Scott. 2004. "Mishandling Suicide Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 27: 67-90.

Bloom, Mia. 2005. Dying to Kill: the Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia University Press.

Crenshaw, Martha. 1998. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice." In Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Fair, C. Christine and Bryan Shepherd. 2006. "Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29: 51-74.

Gause, F. Gregory III. 2005. "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" Foreign Affairs 84: 62-76.

Haddad, Simon and Hilal Khashan. 2002. "Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim Views on September 11." Journal of Conflict Resolution 46: 812-828.

Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. 2002. "The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers: Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?" The New Republic June 24.

Pape, Robert A. 2003. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." American Political Science Review 97: 343-361.
Notes

iSee the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Survey for more information, including sample sizes and exact field dates. The analyses in this report are based on Muslim respondents only, except for Morocco, where a religious preference question was not asked. However, given that Morocco's population is 99% Muslim, it is likely that nearly all of the Moroccan sample is Muslim.
iiThe question was not asked in Turkey.
iiiStandard OLS regression was employed for the questions regarding suicide bombing and other attacks against civilians and confidence in bin Laden and logistic regression for the question concerning whether suicide bombing against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq is justified.
ivTo test the independent importance of the country variables, in each model the country closest to the median position on the attitude in question was excluded. As shown in Table 7, in the first and second models, Pakistan is the excluded country, and the other country dummy variables should be interpreted as in comparison to Pakistan.
vThis was a split form question asked of approximately half the sample.

 

http://www.jews-for-allah.org/

 

Job Announcement: Assistant Director of \223Islamist Watch\224

The Middle East Forum, a think-tank based in Philadelphia, seeks to hire a full-time assistant director for
+\223Islamist Watch.\224

Islamist Watch focuses on Islamists who work lawfully within the system in the West, and who therefore are too often
+overlooked in prosecuting the \223war on terror.\224 For a full description of Islamist Watch, see the Middle East
+Forum website.

Job description:

* Work with Islamist Watch director Paul Belien to research, write, and edit articles to combat the ideas and
+institutions that promote lawful Islamism in the United States and other Western countries.

* Represent Islamist Watch in the media and public speaking.

* Liaise with government officials and others.

* Provide research support to other members of the MEF staff.

* Commission and supervise outside work, both paid and volunteer.

* Fundraise for Islamist Watch.

* Prepare regular progress reports.

 

Job requirements:

* An M.A. in Middle East or Islamic studies; or equivalent job experience.

* Knowledge of radical Islam in the United States.

* An outlook consonant with that of the MEF: \223The Middle East Forum works to define and promote American interests
+in the Middle East through research, publications, and educational outreach. It recommends a policy of fighting
+radical Islam (rather than terrorism), convincing the Palestinians that Israel is permanent, reducing funds going to
+the Middle East for energy purchases, better managing the democratization process, more robustly asserting U.S.
+interests vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and improving Middle East studies.\224 For further information on the organization,
+please visit www.meforum.org.

* A proven ability to write and speak publicly.

* Standard computer skills.

* A willingness to take initiative, meet deadlines, show attention to details, and work on multiple projects
+simultaneously.

Location: The successful candidate is expected to work from the Forum\222s office in Philadelphia.

Compensation: Competitive.

To apply, send:

* Cover letter explaining your interest and qualifications for the position.

* Resume.

* A brief, published writing sample.

* The names of three references.

 

Address: personnel@meforum.org, indicating in the subject line that you are applying for the Islamist Watch position.

Deadline: January 19, 2007





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those are on the level of David Duke (except on the other side). Those are hate sites.

 

No they're not. David Duke is a white supremesist and modern KKK member. Daniel Pipes is an academian expert on the Middle East who has been studying the Islmofacism for about 2 decades. Pipes is a world renown expert on the issue, probably the leading one in the world, which is why he's been targeted by Suadi Arabia in a smear campain.

Get your facts straight.

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Daniel Pipes
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Daniel Pipes
Daniel Pipes

Daniel Pipes, Ph.D. (born September 9, 1949) is an American neoconservative[1] columnist, author, counter-terrorism analyst, and scholar of Middle Eastern history. He has authored 14 books and keeps a widely read blog site. Some of his writings have attracted a great deal of controversy for his outspoken belief that aspects of Islamism are incompatible with democracy, freedom, multiculturalism, and other values he associates with the liberal Western tradition.

Pipes is the founder and director of the Middle East Forum and Campus Watch, a former member of the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and a regular columnist for the New York Sun and The Jerusalem Post. He contributes regularly to David Horowitz's online publication FrontPageMag.com, and has had his work published by many newspapers across North America, including the Washington Post, New York Times, and Wall Street Journal. As of 2006, he has written or co-written 18 books, translated into 19 languages.

He is frequently invited to discuss the Middle East on American network television, as well as by universities and think tanks, has appeared on the BBC and Al Jazeera, and has lectured in 25 countries.

Pipes is also the founder of Campus Watch, an organization and website that claims to support ideological diversity in the academic world and opposes what it sees as both anti-U.S. and anti-Israel bias and conformity. Pipes and the organization were accused of attacking academic freedom in 2002 by publishing a list of academics critical of Israel and US foreign policy [2]. This activity was cited in 2006 in the controversial paper The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy prompting a reply by Pipes[3].
Contents
[hide]

* 1 Background
* 2 Praise, criticism and controversy
o 2.1 Peace Institute appointment
o 2.2 Continued friction
* 3 Opinions
o 3.1 Radical Islam
o 3.2 Support for Japanese Internment during World War II
o 3.3 Arab-Israeli conflict
o 3.4 Policy toward Iraq
o 3.5 Arafat's intentions at Oslo
o 3.6 On Muslims
* 4 Books and policy papers
* 5 Video interviews
* 6 Documentaries
* 7 See also
* 8 External links
o 8.1 Audio and video
* 9 References

[edit] Background

Pipes was born in Boston, Massachusetts, the son of Harvard historian Richard Pipes and his wife Irene (née Roth). Both Pipes' parents were from assimilated Polish Jewish families that escaped from Poland in 1939. The couple met in the United States in 1944, and married two years later. Daniel was their first child.

Pipes attended the Harvard pre-school, then received a private school education, partly abroad. He enrolled in Harvard University in the fall of 1968; for his first two years he studied mathematics, but has stated: "I wasn't smart enough. So I chose to become a historian." He credits visits to the Sahara Desert in 1968 and the Sinai Desert in 1969 for piquing his interest in Arabic, and for the following two years he studied the Middle East. Pipes obtained a B.A. in history in 1971; his senior thesis was titled A Medieval Islamic Debate: The World Created in Eternity, a study of Al-Ghazali, one of the greatest jurists, theologians and mystical thinkers in the Islamic tradition.

He returned to Harvard in 1973 and obtained a Ph.D. in medieval Islamic history in 1978. His Ph.D. dissertation eventually became his first book, Slave Soldiers and Islam, in 1981. He studied abroad for six years, three of which were spent in Egypt, where he wrote a book on colloquial Egyptian Arabic which was published in 1983. He taught world history at the University of Chicago from 1972 to 1982, history at Harvard from 1983 to 1984, and policy strategy at the Naval War College from 1984 to 1986.

Pipes has served in various capacities at the Departments of State and Defense, and has testified to the United States Congress. He has been awarded honorary doctorates from universities in Switzerland and the United States. He speaks French and English and can read Arabic and German.

He has been married twice, and has three daughters.

As of Jan 2 2007 Daniel Pipes was appointed Distinguished Visiting Professor at Pepperdine University teaching a course titled "International Relations: Islam and Politics" [4]

[edit] Praise, criticism and controversy

The Wall Street Journal has called Pipes "an authoritative commentator on the Middle East.[1] Michael Moran of MSNBC described him as one of the best-known "Mideast policy luminaries" [2]. CNN referred to him one "of the country’s leading experts" on the Middle East. In the Boston Globe Jeff Jacoby wrote, "If Pipes's admonitions had been heeded, there might never have been a 9/11." [5]

A 1984 Business Week book review by Ronald Taggiasco stated that "Pipes has handled his subject well. It is difficult these days to address the question of Islam, the Arabs, and their relations with Israel and remain nonpartisan. Pipes has managed to do just that. He has wended his way through that minefield unscathed" (Business Week, January 30, 1984).

On the other hand, a 1983 Washington Post book review by Thomas W. Lippman stated that Pipes displays "a disturbing hostility to contemporary Muslims ... he professes respect for Muslims but is frequently contemptuous of them". It said his book "is marred by exaggerations, inconsistencies, and evidence of hostility to the subject" while admitting that "[f]ew other writers have explained so lucidly such complex developments in Muslim history" and that his "book is a valuable contribution to our understanding" (Washington Post, December 11, 1983).

Pipes' Middle East Forum sparked controversy in September 2002 when it established a website called Campus Watch that claimed to identify five problems in the teaching of Middle Eastern studies at American universities: "analytical failures, the mixing of politics with scholarship, intolerance of alternative views, apologetics, and the abuse of power over students". Students were encouraged to submit reports regarding teachers, books and curricula. The project was accused of "McCarthyesque intimidation" of professors who criticized Israel, when it published a "blacklist" of professors. In protest, more than 100 academics demanded to be listed as well. Campus Watch subsequently removed the list from their website. [6] [7] [8]

[edit] Peace Institute appointment

In April 2003, President Bush nominated Pipes for the board of the federally sponsored U.S. Institute of Peace, on which Douglas Feith was already serving. Soon afterwards, a broad array of Arab-American, American Muslim, and other groups, vehemently denounced the appointment, claiming that Pipes was an "anti-Islamic extremist". A The Washington Post editorial suggested that many Muslims viewed Pipes' nomination as a "sort of cruel joke".[9] The Arab American Institute, headed by James Zogby, stated "For decades Daniel Pipes has displayed a bizarre obsession with all things Arab and Muslim. Now, it appears that his years of hatred and bigotry have paid off with a presidential appointment. One shudders to think how he will abuse this position to tear at the fabric of our nation."

Christopher Hitchens, who is also a prominent critic of Islamists, also expressed "bafflement" at this appointment in a critical essay entitled "Daniel Pipes is not a man of peace" in Slate. [3] Hitchens claimed that Pipes "employs the fears and insecurities created by Islamic extremism to slander or misrepresent those who disagree with him" and that this contradicted the USIP's position as "a somewhat mild organization [...] devoted to the peaceful resolution of conflict." Hitchens concluded his opposition to Pipes' nomination by claiming that Pipes "confuses scholarship with propaganda" and pursues "petty vendettas with scant regard for objectivity."

Others, including Muslims, defended the appointment. Akbar Ahmed, chair of Islamic studies at American University, asked "Who is better placed to act as a bridge than the scholar of Islam?" Pakistani-American Tashbih Sayyed, editor of the Muslim World Today and the Pakistan Times, called Pipes "a Cassandra. He must be listened to. If there is no Daniel Pipes, there is no source for America to learn to recognize the evil which threatens it. Historians will write later that Pipes saved us. There are Muslims in America that are like Samson; they have come into the temple to pull down the pillars, even if it means destroying themselves." Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Subhy Mansour, a former visiting fellow in the human-rights program at Harvard Law School stated "We Muslims need a thinker like Dr. Pipes, who can criticize the terrorist culture within Islam, just as I usually do."[10]

Several senators, including Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) and Christopher Dodd (D-Connecticut), expressed opposition to the nomination and stalled a vote in Chairman Judd Gregg's (R-NH) committee, and President Bush was forced to bypass the Republican-led Senate and proceeded with a recess appointment on August 23, 2003. Pipes served until January, 2005.

 

Continued friction

In January 2004, Left Turn magazine described Pipes as a "leading anti-Muslim hate propagandist".[11] In a publication of Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in a May 2, 2004 Pipes, in The End of American Jewry's Golden Era foresees the end of the golden era for Jews in the United States.

Pipes has had a series of confrontations with various U.S-based Islamic groups, especially the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR has described him as "an Islamophobe," [12] [13] while Pipes in turn charges that CAIR is an apologist for Islamist terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. Robert Spencer described the campaign against Pipes on the CAIR website as a "lynching."

Pipes is also controversial in academia, where his conservative positions—especially his strong support for Israel and his argument that Islamism is a threat to the West—conflicts with the views of some Middle East scholars, such as John Esposito, who describes Islamist movements as political forces leading to democratic progress.

Pipes was invited to speak at the University of Toronto in March 2005 by a new student group at the University called The Middle East Forum at U of T. The announcement sparked the following response: more than 80 professors and former graduate students wrote an open letter in which they claimed that Mr. Pipes had a "long record of xenophobic, racist and sexist [speeches] that goes back to 1990". The letter went on to say that:

Genuine academic debate requires an open and free exchange of ideas in an atmosphere of mutual respect and tolerance. We, the undersigned—professors, librarians and students—are committed to academic freedom and we affirm Pipes' right to speak at our university. However, we strongly believe that hate, prejudice and fear-mongering have no place on this campus.

Pipes responded by stating:

I've been criticized plenty, as this suggests. I'm being criticized today. I grant my critics the right to criticize me. And I retain the right to criticize them. None of us have police powers. Freedom of speech is freedom of speech for those one disagrees with, as well as those one does agree with.

University officials said they would not interfere with Pipes' visit. [14] [15]

On April 29, 2005 Wahida Valiante, the vice-president of the Canadian Islamic Congress, published on its website's regular "Friday Bulletin" the article Worth Repeating: Media Propaganda: Hitler, Bush and the "Big Lie, which suggested Pipes was a follower of Hitler and/or used tactics like Hitler, and that he wanted to ethnically cleanse Muslims from the United States. [16] In its June 10 edition of the Friday Bulletin is issued an "Apology and Retraction", stating:

The Canadian Islamic Congress and Ms. Valiante apologize without reservation and retract remarks in the column that suggest that Dr. Daniel Pipes is a follower of Hitler or that he uses the tactics of Hitler or that he wants to ethnically cleanse America of its Muslim presence". [17] [18]

In May 2006, Pipes received the Guardian of Zion Award.

[edit] Opinions

[edit] Radical Islam

Pipes has long expressed concern about the danger, as he sees it, of radical Islam to the Western world. In 1985, he wrote in Middle East Insight that "[t]he scope of the radical fundamentalist's ambition poses novel problems; and the intensity of his onslaught against the United States makes solutions urgent." [19] In the fall 1995 issue of National Interest, he wrote: "Unnoticed by most Westerners, war has been unilaterally declared on Europe and the United States." [20] Four months before the September 11, 2001 attacks, Pipes and American investigative journalist Steven Emerson wrote in the Wall Street Journal that al Qaeda was "planning new attacks on the U.S." and that Iranian operatives "helped arrange advanced ... training for al Qaeda personnel in Lebanon where they learned, for example, how to destroy large buildings." [21]

[edit] Support for Japanese Internment during World War II

Pipes expressed his support of "the internment of Japanese Americans in World War II because...given what was known and not known at the time...the U.S. government made the correct and sensible decisions."[22] (See also his article Japanese Internment: Why It Was a Good Idea--And the Lessons It Offers Today.[23]) Pipes does not "advocate the internment of anyone today."[24]

[edit] Arab-Israeli conflict

He wrote in Commentary in April 1990: "There can be either an Israel or a Palestine, but not both. To think that two states can stably and peacefully coexist in the small territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea is to be either naïve or duplicitous. If the last seventy years teach anything, it is that there can be only one state west of the Jordan River. Therefore, to those who ask why the Palestinians must be deprived of a state, the answer is simple: grant them one and you set in motion a chain of events that will lead either to its extinction or the extinction of Israel." [25]

[edit] Policy toward Iraq

In 1987, Pipes encouraged the United States to provide Saddam Hussein with upgraded weapons and intelligence [26], ostensibly to counterbalance Iran's successes in the Iran-Iraq War. Years later, in April of 1991, when a debate was raging about the desirability of a U.S. intervention against the Saddam Hussein regime, Pipes wrote in the Wall Street Journal about the prospect of U.S. forces occupying Iraq, "with Schwartzkopf Pasha ruling from Baghdad": "It sounds romantic, but watch out. Like the Israelis in southern Lebanon nine years ago, American troops would find themselves quickly hated, with Shi'as taking up suicide bombing, Kurds resuming their rebellion, and the Syrian and Iranian governments plotting new ways to sabotage American rule. Staying in place would become too painful, leaving too humiliating." [27]

In a New York Post article published April 8, 2003, Pipes expressed his opposition to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's concerned prediction that "[the] war [in Iraq] will have horrible consequences...Terrorism will be aggravated...Terrorist organizations will be united...Everything will be insecure." Though this concern was echoed by various other politicians and academics cited by Pipes in his article[28], Pipes argued that "the precise opposite is more likely to happen: The war in Iraq will lead to a reduction in terrorism."

[edit] Arafat's intentions at Oslo

Writing in The Forward within days of the signing of the Oslo Accords, Pipes said: "Mr. Arafat has merely adopted a flexible approach to fit adverse circumstances, saying whatever needed to be said to survive. The PLO had not a change of heart — merely a change of policy ... the deal with Israel represents a lease on life for the PLO, enabling it to stay in business until Israel falters, when it can deal a death blow." [29]

[edit] On Muslims

Pipes dogmatic tackling of Islamic issues with out flinching as made him a target for supporters of Islamic fanaticism.

"There is no escaping the unfortunate fact that Muslim employees in law enforcement, the military, and the diplomatic corps need to be watched for connections to terrorism, as do Muslim chaplains in prisons and the armed forces. Muslim visitors and immigrants must undergo additional background checks. Mosques require a scrutiny beyond that applied to churches, synagogues, and temples. Muslim schools require increased oversight to ascertain what is being taught to children." --The Jerusalem Post, January 22, 2003 p.9

"Western European societies are unprepared for the massive immigration of brown-skinned peoples cooking strange foods and maintaining different standards of hygiene...All immigrants bring exotic customs and attitudes, but Muslim customs are more troublesome than most." (National Review, November 19, 1990)

On his website, Daniel Pipes notes that the above quote "has over the years attracted considerable attention. My goal in this article ([30]) was to characterize the thinking of Western Europeans, not give my own views. In retrospect, I should either have put the words "brown-skinned peoples" and "strange foods" in quotation marks or made it clearer that I was explaining European attitudes rather than my own. By way of example of those attitudes, here are some quotations from top French politicians from that era" Following this are quotes from Jacques Chirac, François Mitterrand and Valery Giscard d'Estaing.

Of African-American Muslims, Pipes wrote: "...black converts tend to hold vehemently anti-American, anti-Christian, and anti-Semitic attitudes." (Commentary, June 1, 2000)

In an October 16, 1997 article in the The Jewish Exponent, Pipes claimed that "as the population of Muslims in the United States grows, so does antisemitism." ("The New Anti-Semitism," [31])

An article in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs written by Sister Elaine Kelley, Chair of "Friends of Sabeel—North America" (a support group for the Palestinian Christian anti-Zionist[32] groupSabeel), July 2001, claims that Pipes told an audience at Portland State University that "Arab people live in some of the worse conditions in the world, without freedom to travel or modern media." He blamed those conditions on the Arabs’ "political obsession with Israel" (instead of their own societies); according to Kelley he added "The Palestinians are a miserable people, and they deserve to be"[33] but Pipes denies ever saying this.[34]

"The bombing on February 22 of the Askariya shrine in Samarra, Iraq, was a tragedy, but it was not an American or a coalition tragedy. ... [W]hen Sunni terrorists target Shi'ites and vice versa, non-Muslims are less likely to be hurt. ... Civil war in Iraq, in short, would be a humanitarian tragedy but not a strategic one." (New York Sun, February 28, 2006 [35])

On the current population trends of Muslims in Europe: "...the continent could be majority-Muslim within decades. When that happens, grand cathedrals will appear as vestiges of a prior civilization — at least until a Saudi style regime transforms them into mosques or a Taliban-like regime blows them up. The great national cultures — Italian, French, English, and others — will likely wither..." (New York Sun, May 11, 2004 [36])

In a speech to the American Jewish Congress in October 2001, he said: "I worry very much, from the Jewish point of view, that the presence, and increased stature, and affluence, and enfranchisement of American Muslims, because they are so much led by an Islamist leadership, that this will present true dangers to American Jews." [37]

[edit] Books and policy papers

* Miniatures: Views of Islamic and Middle Eastern Politics (2003), Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0215-5
* Militant Islam Reaches America (2002), W.W. Norton & Company; paperback (2003) ISBN 0-393-32531-8
* with Abdelnour, Z. (2000), Ending Syria's Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role Middle East Forum, ISBN 0-9701484-0-2
* In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power(2002), Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0981-8
* Muslim immigrants in the United States (Backgrounder) (2002), Center for Immigration Studies
* The Long Shadow : Culture and Politics in the Middle East (1999), Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-88738-220-7
* The Hidden Hand : Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (1997), Palgrave Macmillan; paperback (1998) ISBN 0-312-17688-0
* Conspiracy : How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From (1997), Touchstone; paperback (1999) ISBN 0-684-87111-4
* Syria Beyond the Peace Process (Policy Papers, No. 41) (1995), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, ISBN 0-944029-64-7
* Sandstorm (1993), Rowman & Littlefield, paperback (1993) ISBN 0-8191-8894-8
* Damascus Courts the West: Syrian Politics, 1989-1991 (Policy Papers, No. 26) (1991), Washington Institute for Near East Policy, ISBN 0-944029-13-2
* with Garfinkle, A. (1991), Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 0-312-04535-2
* From a distance: Influencing foreign policy from Philadelphia (The Heritage lectures) (1991), Heritage Foundation, ASIN B0006DGHE4
* The Rushdie Affair: The Novel, the Ayatollah, and the West (1990), Transaction Publishers, paperback (2003) ISBN 0-7658-0996-6
* Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (1990), Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-506021-0
* An Arabist's guide to Colloquial Egyptian (1983), Foreign Service Institute
* Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System (1981), Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-02447-9

[edit] Video interviews

* Video Conversation with history with Daniel Pipes

[edit] Documentaries

* Obsession: Radical Islam's War Against the West

[edit] See also
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to:
Daniel Pipes

* Middle East Forum
* Campus Watch
* Criticism of Islam
* The End of American Jewry's Golden Era

[edit] External links

* Daniel Pipes’s personal website
* Biography
* List of books
* Controversy surrounding Pipes' appointment to the board of the US Institute of Peace
* Los Angeles Times: “A Misdirected Attack”
* Financial Times: Islam's battle with a hostile world
* Truth on Terror in World Magazine
* Reply to CAIR's Attack on Daniel Pipes Pipes' response
* Harvard Magazine profile
* In Defense of Steven Emerson and Daniel Pipes, a letter from Shaykh Prof. Abdul Hadi Palazzi, Root and Branch Information Service, September 19, 1999
* "Daniel Pipes Visits Hamilton College"
* A60915-2003Aug14&notFound=true Protests against Pipes' appointment to the USIP *The Truth About Daniel Pipes, from the Muslim Public Affairs Council
* Pipes the Propagandist *WHO IS DANIEL PIPES? by CAIR
* Pipes, R. Memoirs of a Non-Belonger. Yale University Press, 2003.
* Press, Eyal. Neocon Man, The Nation, May 10, 2004.
* Rooij de, Paul. "Smear Mongers", CounterPunch, September 24, 2002.
* Scherer, Michael. "Daniel Pipes, Peacemaker?", Mother Jones, May 26, 2003
* Essay detailing Pipes views on Tariq Ramadan and Islamism
* Daniel Pipes, a new kind of Israel-basher - article by Bradley Burston in Haaretz.
* Daniel Pipes and the unfolding civil war in Iraq, World Socialist Website, April 11, 2006.

[edit] Audio and video

* International Conflict Resolution, NPR: Talk of the Nation, August 27 1998
* Harry Kreisler in conversation with Daniel Pipes, UCSD, 2004
* Rethinking Islam, The Connection, September 10 2002
* U.S. Policy Towards Israel and Dreams of Democracy in the Middle East, On Point Radio, May 20 2004
* [http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbreligion/F2213236?thread=3746764 Discussion about Mr Pipes

[edit] References

1. ^ Steigerwald, Bill, "Pipes calls war a success", Pittsburgh Tribune Review, April 1, 2006
2. ^ Moran, Michael, "The evolution of peacemaking", MSNBC, November 21, 2001
3. ^ Hitchens, Christopher, "Daniel Pipes is not a man of peace", Slate, August 11 2003

Persondata
NAME Pipes, Daniel
ALTERNATIVE NAMES
SHORT DESCRIPTION U.S. neoconservative columnist, author, counter-terrorism analyst, and scholar of Middle Eastern history
DATE OF BIRTH 9 September 1949
PLACE OF BIRTH Boston, Massachusetts
DATE OF DEATH
PLACE OF DEATH
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Pipes"

Categories: Living people | 1949 births | American historians | Jewish American journalists | Polish-Americans | Polish Jews | People from Boston | Islam-related controversies | Islamic politics and Islamic world studies | Neoconservatives | Middle East Forum | Campus Watch | American Middle Eastern studies